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Abstract. While peer-to-peer (P2P) file-sharing is a powerful and cost-effective
content distribution model, most paid-for digital-content providers (CPs) use di-
rect download to deliver their content. CPs are hesitant to rely on a P2P distribu-
tion model because it introduces a number of security concerns including content
pollution by malicious peers, and lack of enforcement of authorized downloads.
Furthermore, because users communicate directly with one another, the users can
easily form illegal file-sharing clusters to exchange copyrighted content. Such ex-
change could hurt the content providers’ profits. We present a P2P system TP2P,
where we introduce a notion of trusted auditors (TAs). TAs are P2P peers that
police the system by covertly monitoring and taking measures against misbehav-
ing peers. This policing allows TP2P to enable a stronger security model making
P2P a viable alternative for the distribution of paid digital content. Through anal-
ysis and simulation, we show the effectiveness of even a small number of TAs
at policing the system. In a system with as many as 60% of misbehaving users,
even a small number of TAs can detect 99% of illegal cluster formation. We de-
velop a simple economic model to show that even with such a large presence
of malicious nodes, TP2P can improve CP’s profits (which could translate to user
savings) by 62% to 122%, even while assuming conservative estimates of content
and bandwidth costs. We implemented TP2P as a layer on top of BitTorrent and
demonstrated experimentally using PlanetLab that our system provides trusted
P2P file sharing with negligible performance overhead.
1 Introduction
While P2P presents a powerful and cost-effective file-sharing model due to its ability to
leverage the participating users’ uplink bandwidth, most paid-content providers (CPs)
typically rely on direct download methods to distribute their paid content. For example,
Apple iTunes [14], Amazon [4] and Sony distribute content either directly from their
website or via contracted content delivery networks (CDNs) such as Akamai [3]. The
cost of content delivery, which involves either building infrastructure or paying CDN
fees, is quite significant. While some CPs, such as Warner Bros. and AOL, have begun
to experiment with limited P2P deployment [31] based on proprietary technology most
CPs are reluctant to embrace the cheaper P2P content delivery model. Their worry
is that unlike direct download, P2P introduces a number of security concerns such as
unauthorized downloads of paid content and increased illegal content sharing that could
reduce CPs’ profits. In this paper, we introduce TP2P – an architecture that augments
P2P to address these security concerns. We hope that our extension can help promote a
wider adoption of P2P by content providers and that the content delivery cost savings
could benefit end-users via lowered content prices.
In a P2P model where peers download content from one another rather than from
a centrally managed system, a number of security issues arise. These security threats
include content pollution (as malicious peers could be serving garbage data to one an-
other), unauthorized download of paid content (as it can not be enforced by a CP server
or a CDN), and increased illegal file-sharing of copyrighted content by the P2P peers.
Peers can protect against content pollution via standard hash-checking of the file chunks
that they receive. However, in a P2P system peers do not have an incentive to enforce
exclusively authorized downloads by other peers or to abstain from forming illegal file-
sharing clusters with their neighbors. One reason that some CPs are hesitant to rely
on a P2P model for content distribution is that it can easily deteriorate into a free file-
sharing community similar to Xbox-sky [32] and Red Skunk Tracker [27]). Since P2P
users communicate with one another directly during file distribution, it is easy for them
to form clusters for an illegal file-sharing. To form a cluster, malicious users can use a
simple protocol to “signal” one another as an invitation to join a cluster. Members of a
formed cluster can exchange content that they have purchased or that they will purchase
in the future from the CP. Thus they reduce CP’s profits, as each member of the cluster
only pays for a fraction of content that they obtain.
In order to protect against the threat of illegal file-sharing cluster formation and
unauthorized downloads, we present a new technique that we call “trusted auditing”.
Trusted auditors (or TAs) are a new class of peers that police the P2P system by covertly
monitoring other peers for any sign of misbehavior, such as admitting unauthorized
users or protocol “signaling” that may lead to illegal sharing cluster formation. The
TAs help detect and stop such cluster formation and thus protect the CPs profits. We
model the behavior of TAs and show analytically and with simulations that TAs can
effectively thwart the formation of illegal file-sharing clusters. By introducing this type
of policing by trusted auditors we can provide security guarantees that are similar to
those of direct download systems. We show via an economic model that since the cost
of using the TAs is small TP2P can yield significant profits for the CPs.
When TAs detect misbehavior by a peer, a variety of countermeasures may be taken.
For example, offending peers can be banned from the P2P system to a direct download
system where they cannot exfiltrate any peer information. We stress that we do not
address illegal content sharing over out-of-band channels. Sharing of files after they
have been downloaded can happen regardless of the file distribution mechanism used
by the CP: a user can download a movie via a CDN and then post it for free download
on PirateBay [25]. However, it is important to address the threat of additional illegal
sharing that may occur over the P2P delivery system used by the CP. Imagine the effects
of having millions of iTunes users connected to a P2P system. Many of the users have
demonstrated the willingness to purchase content. Regular users are reluctant to visit
illegal pirated content sites because of the potential legal consequences as these sites
are policed by RIAA, MPAA and third-party companies such as Media Defender [1].
At the same time, simple software can help iTunes users probe their P2P peers and
invite them to share media libraries. Users know that their iTunes peers already have
high quality purchased content and probably share similar interests since they have
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learned one another’s IPs by P2P sharing of the same content. With the use of TAs,
TP2P prevents such additional illegal file-sharing when CP switches to the P2P model.
The contributions of our work are as follows:
• We introduce automated trusted auditors as a controlled and inexpensive way to
monitor and detect certain types of misbehavior in a P2P system.
• We present an analytical model that shows how TAs effectively thwart malicious users
from forming illegal file-sharing clusters. Our analysis shows that even where TAs are
but a small fraction of all peers, they are sufficient at protecting the P2P system against
unauthorized file sharing.
• Using a simple economic model we further show that TP2P provides a more cost-
effective solution than direct download. This results in higher profits for a CP even in
the presence of a large percentage of malicious users.
• Finally, we implement TP2P security elements on top of BitTorrent to demonstrate
that our system can provide its functionality in an existing, widely-used P2P system
with only modest modifications.
2 Related Work
As broadband Internet access becomes more prevalent, digital content stores such as
Apple Itunes and Amazon have begun to distribute richer digital content over the In-
ternet, such as TV series episodes and full-length movies. Since each download re-
quires significant bandwidth, these stores typically contract Content Delivery Networks
(CDNs) to distribute their content. Commercial CDNs include Akamai [3], Limelight
[17] and VitalStream [30]. Since CDNs are centrally managed they can enforce appro-
priate security measures on behalf of a digital store, such as authorization of customers
and encryption of served content. However, the price paid to CDNs for their services is
quite high. Market research [2] suggests that digital media vendors spend 20% of their
revenue on infrastructure costs for serving content. While free academic alternative
CDNs such as Coral [12] and CoDeeN [13] exist, these systems are typically limited in
their deployment and the amount of bandwidth they are allowed to use.
An alternative powerful distribution model is Peer-to-Peer (P2P) systems such as
BitTorrent [6], Napster [21] and Kazaa [15]) among others. No extra contracted band-
width is required as users leverage one another’s upload links to “share” content. Bit-
Torrent is perhaps the most popular of these systems, and many analytical works [34,
11, 16, 10] have shown the high efficiency and scalability characteristics of BitTorrent.
Some companies have begun to adopt the P2P model with some security measures.
MoveDigital [20] implements a gateway in front of a P2P system to allow only au-
thorized users access. However, once inside, users can leverage the system for further
illegal sharing without limitations. For example, if a user can learn the IP addresses of
other users inside the system, she can start sharing content with those users directly for
free, bypassing the up-front payment. Moreover, users might choose to participate in
the P2P system and pay to download files to gain knowledge about other participants
that have similar interests. Then, they can easily form another, private P2P community,
a darknet [5], for free future exchange of similar content
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In contrast, TP2P is designed explicitly to guard against such free file sharing using
an open system architecture that is resistant to exploitation even in the presence of
malicious nodes. TAs used in TP2P are owned and managed by the content provider,
and are unlike reputation-based systems [33] where users simply rate each other such
that the resulting ratings may not be trustworthy.
An additional problem for efficient P2P distribution of content is “free-riding” by
users who do not upload to their neighbors [19]. This problem can be partially addressed
by BitTorrent’s tit-for-tat mechanism [8] which was found to be fairly robust [18]. Ad-
ditional solutions that consider incentives in P2P systems have also been proposed [29,
22, 24, 23]. We believe, that our technique of using TAs could also be used to solve this
problem. We leave this idea as an item for future work and focus here on using TAs to
prevent illegal cluster formation.
3 Architecture
The TP2P architecture is designed as an additional layer for common P2P systems.
This layer consists of components that enforce stronger security and trust in the P2P
system: the authenticator service and trusted auditors. While TP2P layer can be applied
to virtually any common P2P system, we use BitTorrent as the underlying P2P system
as a proof of concept. We selected BitTorrent given its popularity, open implementation,
and its very efficient file-swarming mechanism where users share individual blocks of
a given file.
The goal of BitTorrent is to distribute a file as fast as possible to all connected peers.
BitTorrent splits the file (such as a digital movie) into a number of chunks. Participat-
ing peers exchange individual chunks of the file using a file swarming approach. The
swarming algorithm is fully distributed and nodes use it to decide from which peers
they are going to request their missing chunks. In addition, in each file-sharing instance
there are one or more Seeds present. Seeds are peers that have all the chunks of the given
file. The party that advertises the content typically initializes one or more Seeds with
the full content of the file. A file-sharing instance also contains a Tracker that tracks
all participating peers. A peer joins the system by contacting the Tracker. It receives
a set of usually up to 50 IP addresses of other participating Peers. The Peer then ex-
changes chunks of the file with the other Peers and periodically updates its progress to
the Tracker via announce messages.
3.1 System Overview and Usage
When the user decides to purchase content for the first time, she registers at the content
provider’s portal. She picks a username and a password and enters her payment infor-
mation (i.e., credit card number). She then downloads a software client that allows her
to browse for files, purchase content and perform P2P downloads. For each purchase
at the CP’s portal she obtains a verifiable token (signed credential) that authorizes her
to download the purchased content file. The authenticator also generates credentials for
her to be used for secure communication during the download session. (We occasionally
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Fig. 1. To purchase a file, the user logs in on
the portal, pays, obtains a signed credential
and contacts the tracker for the purchased
file.
Fig. 2. Users authenticate one another and
request file pieces. A fraction of trusted au-
ditors is mixed in among the file-sharing
peers.
refer to the file-sharing instance as a download session.) We describe these parameters
in Section 3.2.
The user is then directed to a tracker that manages a file-sharing instance for the
purchased file. The tracker validates that the user is authorized to perform the down-
load by verifying her credentials. The user’s interaction with the authenticator and the
tracker is depicted in Figures 1 and 2. As in BitTorrent, the tracker assigns a set of
other clients or peers to the new client. The client shares pieces of the purchased file
with her assigned peers using BitTorrent’s file-swarming approach. TP2P differs signif-
icantly from BitTorrent in the assignment of the peers. The TP2P tracker ensures that
a certain fraction of the peers that it assigns are trusted auditors (TAs), as shown in
Figure 2. TAs are special peers who, in addition to participating in a download session,
detect misbehaving peers. The detected malicious peers are identified and “banished”
from the system.
3.2 Authorization
We first describe the authenticator and other modules which enforce strong authoriza-
tion and authentication. When a user purchases the content at the CP’s portal, their
credit card is charged the cost of the content. At that point the authenticator running
on the CP’s portal generates authorization credentials for the user (that will authorize
her to participate in a download session for this content) and sends them to the user
over a secure connection (using SSL). CP also stores the purchase record in case the
user loses her credential due to reboot or another failure and needs to come back to the
authenticator.
Authorization Credentials The authorization credentials given to the user include a
temporary public/private key pair and a signed credential (akin to a public-key certifi-
cate) signed by the authenticator, whose public key is implicitly trusted by all par-
ticipating users (i.e., it is distributed along with the software, or is otherwise well
known). More specifically, we use public-key-signed policy statements (similar in form
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to public-key certificates [7]) issued by the content provider as the basis for authoriza-
tion in our system. These credentials are given to authorized users after a purchase is
made, and can be used as proof to both the Tracker and the other participants in a P2P
download session. The credential includes a Session ID that identifies the user’s down-
load session, an expiration time, the user’s IP address and public key, and an Instance
ID (a unique identifier of the file-sharing instance managed by the Tracker).
Verification by Tracker Following the previous step, the user establishes an encrypted
TCP connection to the Tracker using the Tracker’s public key and sends its signed cre-
dential. The Tracker validates the digital signature of the credential against the authen-
ticator’s public key, confirms that the user’s IP matches the one in the credential, and
that the credential has not expired and that the Instance ID refers to a valid download
instance.
If all the parameters are confirmed, the Tracker assigns and sends a list of other
peers to the new user, along with a new credential that lets the new user contact other
nodes of the same session.
Peer VerificationWhen establishing communication, nodes that implement the correct
protocol verify their peers using the tracker-issued credentials: the signature, IP address,
public/private key binding, expiration, and instance ID. After verification, they negotiate
a symmetric session key for their encrypted TCP connection using their public/private
keys.
Certificate Revocation If a peer loses a credential, due to hardware down-time or local
network down-time, she will re-login to the authenticator with her username and pass-
word and obtain new credentials. However, before the new credentials are issued the
authenticator revokes the old credentials. The authenticator contacts the tracker previ-
ously assigned to this user and invalidates the old session ID. In response the tracker
sends out new ACLs to the peers assigned to the peer with revoked session ID. The
credentials and ACL revocation prevent a user from having multiple simultaneous iden-
tities in the system, thereby avoiding a scenario where a malicious user may attempt to
steal and reuse the identity of an authorized user. Observe, that if the user machine is
assigned a new IP by a local DHCP server after a network down-time, the new IP will
be included with the new signed credentials.
3.3 Detecting Malicious Behavior with Trusted Auditors
The TAs imitate other peers through their participation in the P2P file exchange. In ad-
dition, they passively and actively detect malicious nodes that either allow download
of unauthorized content or signal one another to form illegal file-sharing clusters. After
malicious nodes are detected they are “banished” to an isolated direct-download sys-
tem for future downloads. There they can no longer exploit the P2P system to form
new content-sharing clusters. As a deterrent, the banished nodes may also be charged
a penalty of the bandwidth cost for their future downloads. Alternatively, they may be
warned with a temporary fine or threatened with legal action. The deterrent may vary
according to the policy chosen by the CP as we discuss in Section 4.3. Since TAs also
consume bandwidth and require a maintenance cost the relative number of the TAs must
remain small.
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Defining Malicious Behavior The system maintains and updates a definition list of
malicious behavior (MDL) that can lead to unauthorized downloads and establishment
of covert channels. The TAs can easily monitor the behavior described in the MDL. TAs
can steer clear of false positives by following the full protocol that the malicious users
use to exchange illegal content and incriminate them with evidence of such transaction.
Initially the MDL includes unauthorized or unencrypted connections, connections to a
non-protocol port and connections to a proper port that is not formatted according to
TP2P protocol.
The CP employs two strategies in updating the MDL. One strategy involves actively
searching, studying and running the software that malicious users use. The second strat-
egy is learning the malicious probing format and pattern on the fly. This approach is
based on recent work done at UC Berkeley on the RolePlayer system [9]. RolePlayer
installed on a TAmachine can quickly learn and replay various network communication
patterns.
In order to form an illegal cluster malicious users attempt to discover one another
by either establishing a covert channel or by accepting one. With high probability, the
malicious node will probe a TA or reply to a probe from a TA and thus be detected
and banished from the P2P system. Of course, here is also a small probability that a
malicious node will find other malicious users by such probing and form a file-sharing
cluster which diminishes with the size of the cluster. Thus, a more aggressive malicious
node who may attempt to probe more neighbors aiming in forming a bigger malicious
cluster, runs a higher risk of being detected by a TA and being banished to a direct
download system. We explore and model the optimal strategy for a malicious node and
the detection probability in detail in Section 4.
Behavior of Trusted Auditors TAs act as hidden “sentinels” in the system to prevent
malicious probing, and therefore significantly limit the ability of illegal cluster forma-
tion. To stay hidden, TAs mimic different roles: regular or “neutral” nodes and malicious
nodes. In their “neutral” role, TAs mimic the behavior of P2P peers by implementing
the same discovery and download protocols, exhibit similar download speeds, arrival
and departure rates as the regular clients. In their “malicious” role, TAs mimic the be-
havior of malicious nodes by sending out probes to their neighbors at the same rate as
other malicious nodes.
3.4 Security Analysis
TP2P architecture was designed to ensure that a P2P content delivery system could ex-
hibit similar security properties to a direct download system. In particular, we consider
threats where users may attempt to exploit the P2P system by attempting illegal cluster
formation and unauthorized downloads. We further classify the former threat into an
insider and outsider attacks. In insider attacks a P2P participant may contact another
participant during a download session. For outsider attacks, a node records the IP of it’s
peers and tries contact them from another IP address either during or after the download
session. In the next session, we discuss how TP2P addresses those threats.
Insider Attacks One class of attacks against TP2P can stem from malicious users who
purchase content and thus obtain the proper authorization to join a file-sharing instance.
Such insider malicious users can then attempt to discover other malicious users among
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the file-sharing peers and form a collaborative network for future unauthorized sharing.
For instance, if five malicious users with similar interests discover each another during
a file-sharing instance, then in the future only one out of five will need to purchase new
content and share it with the rest. TP2P offers protection against this abuse by including
TAs in the file-sharing network. The role of the TAs is to detect any malicious user
attempting to scavenge information for future sharing. There are two ways in which
TAs can detect malicious users: either because the malicious user contacts the TA and
attempts to share unauthorized content, or because she allowed a TA to contact her and
share content without proper authorization.
But how can we make sure that the identities of TAs are not exposed to the malicious
nodes rendering them ineffective? There are two ways in which a TA can be exposed
over time: either by learning the TA network locations (IP addresses) or by observing
their behavior in the P2P system (i.e., when they perform active probing or detect a
malicious node). To avoid simple detection of the TAs’ IP address pool based on their
location, we can rent IP address space from Internet Service Providers based on their
user population [28]. Moreover, for more sophisticated attacks that can learn even those
IPs over time, we can request the TAs’ IPs to be given via the same DHCP servers that
the ISPs use for their own users. This will make the tracing of the TAs IPs futile since
their IPs do not only change over time but are also shared with regular Internet users.
The second way to expose a TA is to learn to identify its behavior, in particular as it
pretends to be malicious and probes other nodes. However, this is only true if malicious
nodes already have the knowledge of what it is deemed a “normal” probing rate or they
don’t probe at all (thus exposing the TAs). In both cases, this requires some sort of
previous shared knowledge among malicious nodes about the malicious behavior that
they should exhibit. However even in the extreme case that malicious users have pre-
agreed on a way of probing, the TAs can mimic such behavior because they are also
receiving a fraction of the malicious probes. Thus, the TAs can adjust their behavior
based on the probes that they themselves receive (remember that TAs communicate
with one another their common knowledge about the received probing rates).
How can we protect the system from Denial of Service (DoS) attacks? Since TAs mimic
the malicious node probing behavior, the increased rate of probing may cause TAs to
amplify their probing and thus cause a DoS attack. To avoid this, we use randomized
traffic thresholds for the probing rates received from the attackers. TAs do not probe
beyond those rates. At the same time, malicious nodes that use DoS run the risk of
being easily detected by the TAs. Thus, a DoS to scan for other malicious nodes in
the P2P, even a short one, represent a prohibitive cost for the malicious user since the
probability of being detected and shut down is high.
Outside Probing In this type of attack, an insider participates legitimately in a down-
load session and collects the list of Peer IPs. It attempts to contact these IPs in search of
other malicious nodes from an external IP either during or after the download session.
Observe that contacts from outsiders who learn these IPs from a third party also fall
under this type of attack. To address such outside scanning we use TAs who are not
part of the P2P network to mimic the behavior of the outside scanning. Note that for
a malicious node inside the P2P network there is little incentive to answer an outside
probe. The reason for this is that outsiders are less likely to have content for trading. On
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the other hand, nodes inside the P2P are far more likely to have content worth trading
since they have proven that they are actually willing to buy such content. All things be-
ing equal in terms of scanning, by replying to outside probes malicious insiders run the
same risk of detection with uncertain gains. In practice, there is no incentive for a ma-
licious insider to respond to outside probes. The TAs prevent a possible DoS behavior
by setting high random thresholds in the traffic they receive. Furthermore, as we show
in our analysis in Section 4, the mere knowledge that TAs are present in the network
causes rational malicious nodes to behave more cautiously and thus less dangerously
towards the CP. TAs help to set the bar of malicious exploitation high by detecting ma-
licious users who have purchased content and thus have gained authorized entry into
the system. Furthermore, TAs detect users that do not honor (enforce) the authorization
credentials generated by the authenticator.
Unauthorized Downloads Similarly, TAs probe the peers to check whether they allow
unauthorized or unauthenticated downloads, by attempting to connect to them without
proper credentials. Peers that deviate from the protocol by not enforcing the security
checks are banned to the direct download system and may be selectively warned or
penalized as a deterrent.




































































Fig. 3. CP profit per user download. Distinct combinations of D (profit before bandwidth) and B
(bandwidth cost) capture variations in possible royalties and bandwidth agreements
4 Analysis
We have discussed two threats that may exist in the P2P framework for paid content
distribution: unauthorized downloads and illegal file-sharing cluster formation. In the
case of the first threat the user that allows an unauthorized download has nothing to
gain by deviating from the TP2P protocol. In the case of the second threat each user
that joins a cluster gets some content for free from the other cluster members. In this
section, we focus our analysis on the threat of cluster formation and effectiveness of
TAs in thwarting such activity. We analyze the strategy of malicious nodes and show
that even a small number of the TAs can effectively curb the growth of clusters and
successfully protect the CP’s profits.
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4.1 Economic Impact
We propose a simple economic model to quantify the impact that malicious nodes have
on the CP’s profit. We assume that the average price of digital content sold by the CP is
S dollars. The CP pays a large part of that price as royalties $R to the content owner (a
movie studio for example), and retains $D. (D = S − R). In a direct download system
the CP also pays $B for the bandwidth required to serve a file of average size to the
end user. Thus the CP’s profit per movie purchase is, on average, $(D − B). The market
research in [2] shows that digital movie and audio stores pay roughly 60 − 70% of end
price (S ) in royalties and the cost of bandwidth amounts to about 20%. Using a store
similar to Apple Itunes as an example, one can purchase standard length (1GB) digital
movies for $10. We assume that D, the store’s profit before bandwidth cost is $3 to $4
and B, the cost of bandwidth is roughly $2 per download. We experiment with these
assumptions in this section, but our results hold for wider ranges of values.
Using a P2P download approach the CP saves on most of the bandwidth cost and
claims a full $D as profit. Unfortunately, in the presence of malicious users the CP
collects smaller amount of revenue, and thus smaller profit since the malicious nodes
form clusters to avoid full content payment. For example, if two malicious users man-
age to discover each other in the P2P system they will form a cluster of size 2. Then,
these users will take turns purchasing files and sharing them with each other for free
instead of buying them through the CP. For simplicity, we assume that malicious and
non-malicious (or neutral) users desire to accumulate files at the same rate (e.g. say
they download one movie per week), and that their interests are similar and thus they
only need to purchase files at a fraction of the rate of the neutral users. For instance,
in a cluster of two malicious nodes they each purchase movies at half the rate of the
neutral. In general, users who belong to a cluster of size K need to purchase content at
a 1K fraction of the rate of the neutral users to get the same number of files in a given
time interval. This scenario is pessimistic, since we assume that we lose from all mali-
cious clusters whereas in practice, only some of the users in the cluster will want any
particular file.
A single download session consists of up to Ns nodes that are all assigned to one
another by a tracker. For a popular file, the system runs multiple download sessions
of up to Ns nodes each. We assume that a single session contains at most M malicious
nodes, T TAs and Q neutral nodes with Ns = Q+M+T . In a BitTorrent network a typical
value of Ns is around 50 − 60 nodes, thus in our system we will assume a maximum
bound of Ns = 100. Let Mi be the number of users in the system who are malicious and
who belong to clusters of size i. Then M =
∑
i=1
Mi. We define mi = Mi/(M + Q) and
m = M/(M + Q) to denote the ratio of malicious users to the total number of malicious
and neutral nodes. The amortized profit received by the CP for each file is:






The first term in Equation 1 is the CP profit from neutral users who pay a full price.
The second term is from malicious users who pay only a fraction 1i of the price based on
their cluster size i (assuming multiple downloads). On the other hand, the profit of the
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CP in a direct-download system per download is D−B. As a reminder, we do not attempt
to solve out-of-band sharing that can exist with both direct and P2P systems. Rather, we
are interested in curbing file-sharing from clusters formed by malicious exploitation of
the P2P distribution system itself.
Using Equation 1, we produce the CP profit plots varying D and B. Figure 3 depicts
CP profit curves for the P2P and the direct download systems for values of m ranging
from 0 to 80%. Each plot uses different values for D and B to allow for variations in
the cost of royalties and bandwidth. The x-axis shows the maximum size of a malicious
cluster, K. The y-axis shows the average profit claimed by the CP user download. Each
plot contains two horizontal lines: the top one representing a profit of a P2P system
assuming no malicious nodes and the bottom one representing profit of a direct down-
load system. The difference between the two plots is exactly B, the cost of bandwidth
per download. The non-linear curves plot Equation 1 and represent the profit of a P2P
system with various fractions m of malicious users. The plots show that as the fraction
of malicious nodes and the file-sharing clusters that they form grow the profits for the
P2P system dwindle. In fact, as the malicious nodes’ fraction approaches 80% and for
malicious clusters of > 20 nodes, the CP collects less than half the profits of a direct
download approach. Even for less aggressive collections of malicious users, we see that
most of the economic advantage of P2P rapidly diminishes.
4.2 Probing Game
We model the interaction between the malicious nodes and TAs as a probing game: ma-
licious nodes probe and reply to probes from other malicious nodes in order to form and
grow a malicious cluster. To detect malicious nodes, TAs also pretend to be malicious.
They actively send probes and reply to probes of malicious nodes. To avoid being de-
tected a malicious node must not probe all of its neighbors. Instead, she chooses a finite
strategy that we call a growth factor (GF) which reflects the minimum cluster size that
she aims to belong to at the end of the download session. The malicious node probes
and replies to probes until she discovers at least GF − 1 other malicious nodes which
may include a TA pretending to be malicious. For GF = 1 malicious nodes behave as a
neutral nodes. If GF > M the malicious nodes are certain to hit a TA and thus become
detected before they can grow into a cluster of size GF. Thus, 1 < GF ≤ M.
In general, we make the following assumptions: malicious nodes remain “active”
(i.e. they send and reply to probes) until they reach their growth factor of GF. Each
malicious node knows both M and T in a download session, and based on that picks the
most profitable value of GF. We suggest a good value for GF later in the section based
on a simulation of multiple games. In the end of the session if a cluster formed during
the session includes a TA (that pretended to be malicious) all the malicious nodes in
the cluster are assumed to be “detected” and they are warned and “banished” by the CP.
Such nodes still do not know which of the cluster nodes was trusted and thus cannot
assume that they can share with the nodes they already discovered. Both malicious
nodes and TAs send probes to randomly chosen neighbors at the same probing rate per
node. TAs send probes at the same rate to be indistinguishable from malicious nodes.
Otherwise, collaborating malicious nodes could easily pick out TAs in the system.Upon
receiving probes, neutral nodes simply ignore them.
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Fig. 4. For a single game, probability that a mali-
cious node succeeds in forming a cluster of at least
its growth factor with 50% of malicious users
Figure 4 shows the probability that
a malicious node succeeds in forming
the desired cluster size. Here the frac-
tion of malicious nodes in the down-
load session m is fixed at 50% and the
number of trusted T is varied over dif-
ferent ratios of M/T . The x-axis shows
the strategy (i.e. growth factor) chosen
by the malicious nodes in the game.
The y-axis gives the probability that a
node succeeds in achieving reaching its
selected growth factor. As an example,
the scenario of M/T = 1 (the num-
ber of malicious nodes and TAs is the
same) and a target GF = 2, shows that
the probability of a node succeeding
in forming a cluster of size 2 is about
25%. Thus there is a 3/4 chance that a
node gets detected in such a game. An important observation about this plot is that all
curves are decreasing monotonically. That means that as the malicious nodes become
more aggressive by picking larger growth factors, they are also more likely to be de-
tected. Interestingly, even for the top curve (M/T = 10) and the least aggressive target
of GF = 2, there is only a 77% chance that such a node succeeds (i.e., there is a 23%
chance that it becomes detected). So, even in a favorable scenario, the probability that
the node does not become detected in k independent games is roughly only .77k.
4.3 Simulation and Results
We used MatLab to simulate the overall behavior of a BitTorrent-like P2P system with
neutral, malicious and trusted nodes. We varied the overall system size, ranging from
105 to 107 participants. Our results remain consistent for all sizes. The plots presented
in this paper are obtained using a population of 2 · 106 nodes. Our aim was to examine
the performance limits of our system under diverse operating conditions by varying
both the fraction of the malicious nodes M and their relative ratio to the TAs M/T .
In addition, we wanted to find which growth factor is more beneficial for the malicious
nodes across multiple downloads. We picked 30 downloads as the number we use for the
multiple plots, because at 30 downloads we have detected the overwhelming majority of
the formed clusters for all M/T ratios we consider. In addition, after 30 downloads, we
notice that new clusters are formed almost exclusively by the newmalicious arrivals and
thus we consider the distribution to be stable. We assumed a renewal rate (departure and
arrival of new users between downloads ) of 5%. (Higher renewal rates result in even
less effective cluster formation for malicious nodes).
In Figure 5, we present results from multiple downloads and for growth factors
GF = 2 and GF = 3. The depicted results indicate that there is very little difference
in the malicious cluster size distribution (CDF) when comparing GF = 2 and GF = 3
with the first having slightly better results. Therefore, the malicious users should select
12





























Malicious Cluster Size CDF for GF=3, m=50%
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Malicious Cluster Size CDF for GF=2, m=50%
M/T=10 M/T=5 M/T=1 M/T=0.5
Fig. 5. Cumulative probability of forming clusters for growth factor GF = 2 and GF = 3 for
multiple games. Notice that both plots look similar and that for M/T = 10, GF = 2 results in
slightly larger cluster sizes.
GF = 2 as their growth factor if they want to optimize their probability of being in a
larger cluster over multiple downloads.
The main result of the system with TAs is a high detection rate of the malicious
nodes. In fact, in our simulation even starting with m = 60% of malicious nodes and
M/T = 10 with GF = 2 after the multi-game simulation reaches steady state we ob-
served that more than 99% of the malicious nodes in the system have been “detected”.
80% of the malicious nodes failed to form clusters of even a small size prior to detec-
tion.
With the conservative policy, the CP warns the detected malicious users but leaves
them in the P2P system. The CP threatens a fine or court action for illegal activity and
forces them to re-download a new software client. If the CP believes that almost all
such users will behave neutrally then it continues to make $D in profit from these users.
Equation 2 presents the amortized profit per download under this policy.





) − B · T
M + Q
(2)
This is an extension of equation 1 with the additional term: −B · TM+Q that accounts
for the bandwidth used by the TAs normalized by the total number of malicious and
neutral users in the system. Figure 6 compares the profits of an unprotected system
with that of TP2P based on a multi-game simulation (with the parameters as describe
above) when it reaches steady state. TP2P shows much higher profits. For instance with
m = 60%, M/T = 10, D = 4 and B = 2 the profit is 122% higher for TP2P. Observe,
that if instead the CP decides to move the detected nodes to a direct download system
and charge them a penalty of their bandwidth cost the equation 2 also describes the
resulting profit. In this situation the CP still makes $D from each download.
With an aggressive policy the CP does not trust the detected users to behave neu-
trally after a warning. The CP moves the detected users to a direct download system but
does not charge them a bandwidth penalty. These users are no longer a threat but the CP
now loses $B of bandwidth cost for their downloads. Equation 3 shows the profit based
13



















































CP Profit with Bandwidth Cost B=2
P2P, m=0%
P2P TR M/T=10, 5% renewal , m=20%
P2P TR M/T=10, 5% renewal , m=40%
P2P TR M/T=10, 5% renewal , m=60%
P2P TR M/T=10, 5% renewal , m=80%
P2P TR M/T=10, 5% renewal , m=90%
Direct Download
Fig. 6. Comparison of CP profits between a protected and an unprotected system for bandwidth
cost of 2. On the left we have a system without TAs and on the right a system with a ratio of TAs
to malicious users being 10. The protected system yields more profits that are comparable to a
P2P system without malicious peers
on this policy where the CP loses $B on m1 fraction of nodes - the singleton malicious
nodes that are detected.





) + (D − B) · m1 − B · TM + Q (3)
Even with this assumption in the case of m = 60%, M/T = 10, D = 4 and B = 2 the
steady state profit is 62% greater even with very few TAs. For a very high initial value
of m = 90%, the profit curve under this policy overlaps with direct download. The CP
can improve the profit by moving detected nodes only temporarily until they can gain
higher reputation. We leave this item for future study.
5 Implementation & Performance
We implemented an TP2P prototype by adding modifications to the existing BitTorrent
client and Tracker (ver. 3.9.1) written in Python. Our modest modifications included
adding secure channel communication using RC4 encryption, assignment of trusted
auditors by the Tracker, and the distribution of credentials by the tracker to the peers.
We conducted our experiments using PlanetLab [26] to compare the download speed
of TP2P clients compared to BitTorrent clients on a set of geographically distributed
machines given the overhead of secure communication and credentials distribution and
verification in TP2P. Most machines used were equipped with 3GHz processors and ran
the Linux 2.6.12 kernel.
For our first test, we deployed 41 BitTorrent clients randomly distributed in the con-
tinental US. A node was designated as the Seed client and initialized it with a 512MB
movie file. To stress our system, we stored no parts of the file on the rest of the clients
before the test. We ran the Tracker process on a machine outside of PlanetLab, a blade
server with 3.06GHz processors, running a Linux 2.6.11 kernel, and a 10Mbit/sec up-
load bandwidth link. We ran the test both with the unmodified BitTorrent code and with
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TP2P. The BitTorrent download times were only 0.8% faster on average, showing that
TP2P adds negligible performance overhead.
For our second test, we performed a similar experiment as the first test but using a
more dynamic scenario where peers join the download system at staggered times. We
began with one Seed and 76 clients. The 76 clients joined the system at 2 minute in-
tervals. By the time the later peers start, more clients in the system already have partial
data sets. Therefore, newer clients have more sources to download the data from and
thus their download times are generally faster. For this test, TP2P clients on average
slightly outperformed BitTorrent by about 0.5%. This was due to the fact that the TP2P
nodes contact the Tracker more frequently and receive new connection assignments at
a faster rate at startup. As a result, initially they have slightly more choices for select-
ing faster sources. The CPU overhead on the TP2P clients was also minimal as RC4
encryption is a fast stream cipher. Average CPU utilization on the TP2P and BitTorrent
clients was almost identical at roughly 1.3% and 1.23% respectively.
6 Conclusions
We introduced the concept of TAs to a P2P setting: by policing the system, TAs are able
to enforce TP2P protocols and guarantee security properties that are similar to those of
a direct download system. We have analyzed TP2P by modeling it as a game between
malicious users who try to form free file sharing clusters and trusted auditors who curb
the growth of such clusters. We have combined this analysis with a simple economic
model to quantify the cost-effectiveness of our approach in the presence of malicious
users. Our analysis shows that even when 60% of the participants in a system are ma-
licious users, our system can detect 99% of malicious users and prevent them from
forming large clusters, thereby providing strong protection of the P2P system against
unauthorized file sharing. For most configurations, our analysis shows that TP2P yields
profits that are between 62% and 122% higher than a direct download system based
on conservative profit and bandwidth cost models. We demonstrate that TP2P can be
implemented on top of BitTorrent with modest modifications, and provides its content
protection and economic benefits with negligible performance overhead compared to
vanilla BitTorrent.
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